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I. INTRODUCTION
George Orwell was all wrong. Well, at least he was wrong about the
year. His novel, 1984, imagined a world where individuals had no
privacy, were overseen, cloned and bred by an omnipresent government.
Although we have yet to live in the world of 1984, the culture of the
information highway, global community, and genome mapping is upon
US.
* Professor of Law and Director of Center for Governmental Responsibility, University
of Florida; B.A., 1969, Stetson University; J.D., 1972, University of Florida.
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Constitutions, the rule of law and social contracts have tried to
protect citizens from their governments for hundreds of years. Is the law
up to the challenge of protecting our privacy? Examples of destruction
of human privacy are legion. From drug testing of welfare recipients to
controlling our decisions about sex, birth and death, government has
believed that it should tell us how to live and that it should be able to
collect information about us.
Just how personal can this information get? President Clinton said,
"I think it won't be too many years before parents will be able to go
home from the hospital with their newborn babies with a genetic map
in their hands that will tell them, here's what your child's future will be
like."'
American constitutional law has called privacy "the right to be let
alone" derived from "penumbras"3 of the Constitution. The Florida
Constitution says it in the text: "Every natural person has the right to be
let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life
except as otherwise provided herein ... ."
The law of privacy has been forged in a caldron of issues like
abortion and assisted suicide. The facts of these situations are so
fundamental and personal that the law seems ill equipped to draw subtle
lines.' Yet, if the law does not, who or what will?
Past cultures have treated the individual's right to privacy in
radically different way. The way a society treats an individual is based
on factors ranging from physical environment to ideology, religion, and
even the status or wealth of the individual.
For example, hunting conditions and weather conditions may dictate
tribal considerations of privacy. Of course the threshold question of
governance and control over individual decisions is elemental. When a
larger public authority and issues concerning a larger public welfare
emerge, the individual is instantly subject to the public authority's
controls.
II. CULTURAL CONTEXT
While the courts have formulated tests for protecting the individual's
right to privacy in this country, we should ask, what is the human basis
1. Alison Mitchell, They See the Future and It Works for Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
19, 96, at A26.
2. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
4. FLA. CONST. art. I, sec. 23 (emphasis added). The author sponsored the privacy
amendment in the Florida Legislature.
5. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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for these tests? Ultimately, the right to privacy must be founded upon
human "expectations of privacy." However, that which is a reasonable
intrusion to one person may be inconceivable to another. A test may
seek to be objective, but it is the subjective beliefs of the individuals
within the community that define the "reasonable expectation" which
will apply to each individual. Consequently, examining various cultural
or national values and beliefs provides perspective on the development
of the judicial quest for reasonable expectations of privacy.
Essentially, an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is
arrived at based on the individual's experiences and values derived from
his or her own culture. The culture, in turn, is shaped by many
factors-religion, climate, governmental structure, ideology, geography,
history, and scientific advancement, to name but a few. Not only does
culture influence the definition of individual rights, but the definition of
individual rights ultimately influences the future of the culture. Thus, in
smaller countries and homogenous cultures, the reasonable expectation
of one may be very much the same as everyone else's. However, in
large, heterogeneous countries like the United States, the factors play
different roles from region to region, state to state, and community to
community.
Finally, an individual's wealth also plays a role in determining a
person's actual access to personal privacy. Whether it be the different
expectations and privileges found among the classes in Ancient Greece
or modem America, one's actual access to privacy is heavily influenced
by one's ability to buy it. Those who can buy large homes surrounded
by walls and who can pay to defend their rights in court can expect
much more privacy than those who must live in crowded apartments in
crowded cities.
It is important, then, not only to examine the effect one's culture has
upon one's reasonable expectation of privacy but also to explore what
happens when the right to privacy is defined on a level that stretches
across many cultures. In other words, we must decide whether it is
better to leave the definition of our right to privacy to the United States
Supreme Court or to more local institutions like state legislatures or
state supreme courts.
Reasonable expectations of privacy vary not only from person to
person, but also across time and culture. Thus, by looking to anthropolo-
gy and examining a variety of cultures and behavioral patterns, we can
gain a more acute perspective as to what reasonable expectations of
privacy others have formed and on what grounds these expectations rest.
The expected level of privacy in a given society is substantially related
to how the society defines the individual in relation to the public realm.
Further, surrounding circumstances such as climate, religion, and
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availability of food play a role in defining the expectation of privacy.
Often, there is one factor that dominates the individual's rights and
expectations. For example, the climate dominates the lives of the Arctic
Eskimos, religion dominated the ancient Hebrew society, and ideology
dominated Nazi Germany. In other cultures, all of the factors mesh to
create a complex amalgam of influences upon an individual's rights and
expectations.
Thus, as we examine other societies, we first must determine whether
there is an organized public structure and, if so, just how influential and
pervasive it is. Obviously, if there is no public, governing structure,
there can be no state- sanctioned invasion of privacy. Surely, one person
may invade another's privacy by preventing that person from making a
decision or by collecting information about that person, but we are
concerned with the state's role in one's private life. The focus of this
essay is the deprivation and protection of one's right to privacy and the
process through which deprivation or protection is achieved, not whether
all individuals have a sense of privacy. Even with no intruding
government, there is still independent thought and action, and people
will differ in how much they value their privacy.
The second task is to identify the major cultural factors at work
within the society. Is the climate so extreme that most of the people's
efforts are spent dealing with Mother Nature? Does one ideology,
whether religious or otherwise, dominate the hearts and minds of the
citizens so that there is little uncertainty as to how far the government
may intrude into their lives? Does no one factor dominate or do the
factors vary in importance across the society so that it becomes very
difficult to determine objectively what is a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" and what is not? The factors that define the culture and the
structure of the public realm will determine the scope of an individual's
right to privacy within that culture.
An anthropological look at undeveloped, non-literate societies with
little or no public realm reveals that factors such as environment,
economic cooperation, conflict, family, and religion all interact to
establish the individual expectation of privacy, as well as the societies'
standard of privacy. Moreover, whether these societies have a public
realm at all also becomes quite relevant because without a public aspect
to their daily lives, there cannot be a contrasting private realm. Studies
of Arctic Eskimos, Siriono Indians, Mbuti Pygmies, and Jivaro Indians
provide contrasting examples of how less-developed societies treat
individual privacy.6
6. This essay only discusses the Eskimos. I currently am writing a book on the right to
privacy which will delve into much greater detail comparing various societies.
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Eskimo culture illustrates how a relatively harsh climate or environ-
ment may compel a low expectation of privacy. The bitter Arctic
climate, coupled with the lack of modem technology, has produced a
significant degree of interdependence in Eskimo society.' During
winters, members of Eskimo society need to congregate to survive in
their frozen environment They are forced to live with extended family
and even neighbors in close quarters in small igloos.
Moreover, the "real family" of Eskimos, including both the nuclear
and extended family, is the main social unit for both production and
consumption.9 In addition to cooperating to stay warm, they live, work,
travel, and share whatever they have with each other. A dangerous
environment where food and supplies are scarce also requires sharing
and responsiveness to the needs of one another. This closeness can
intrude on privacy concerning excretion and sexual intercourse. The
Eskimos are also very modest, so excretion takes place in a small can
under the bedcovers, and the can is later taken outside to a larger
drum.'" Furthermore, sexual arousal must be delicately controlled, and
intercourse had to take place silently."
Although the forced intimacy of igloos removes privacy in one sense,
the feeling of family closeness also generates a sense of privacy for the
Eskimos' thoughts and feelings. They appreciate independent thought.
In fact, there are no formal chiefs or institutions which have higher
authority than that of the family. An anthropologist who lived with the
Utku Eskimos commented that even after living with them for a long
time and with a command of the language, she was unable to have
close, intimate talks with them. 2 They were almost always polite
towards her and made sure that her needs were met, but there remained
a line that she could not cross. 3 Thus, they had a sense of privacy and
separation from outsiders but little sense of privacy among family. The
family unit had an expectation of privacy for itself as a unit as
compared with outsiders. As Barrington Moore describes it:
7. See BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY
3-80 (1984). Much of Moore's discussion of Eskimo culture comes from a study of the
Utkuhikhalingmiut (Utku) society done by an anthropology graduate student in 1963. See JEAN
L. BRIGGS, NEVER IN ANGER: PORTRAIT OF AN ESKIMO FAMILY (1970).
8. MOORE, supra note 7, at 5.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id.
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[B]oth the capacity and desire to control feelings, especially
hostile feelings, are part of a desire to maintain an atmo-
sphere of social harmony. It would be misleading to label
this air of smiling politeness and consideration for others as
a facade, with the implication that it is a decoration without
structural function. In a society with no formal institutions
for the exercise of authority and with an individualistic or
familistic economy, and where all members are exposed
intermittently to risks of drowning, freezing, and running
short of food or other supplies crucial for survival-not to
mention comfort by Eskimo standards-it makes excellent
adaptive sense to create and sustain an ethos of social
harmony and considerateness alongside one of sturdy self-
reliance. 4
Unlike an individual in a large society, like America, where the
distinction between public and private is easy to recognize, the
distinction for Eskimos is quite subtle. There is no public institution to
protect or take away privacy; there is only the family and custom. Thus,
the anthropologist could only probe so far. The Utku must maintain a
sense of civility among themselves in order to survive. This is seen in
their sharing of resources when needed, always with a smile and without
hesitation.
However, the smile often conceals all-too-human emotions and
thoughts of resentment and hostility. The responsibility to share with
others and make sure that everyone has enough can cut into an adult's
time, and if one person or family is too often in need or reluctant to
share, there will be resentment. In a sense, this need to share and look
out for the whole invades an individual's private life. Survival requires
them to take time away from themselves and give it to others. 5 The
Utku are without a public authority, governed instead largely by familial
relations, yet they have developed very different views of the personal
and how much of themselves they can keep from others. For our
purposes, they serve to demonstrate the way cultural factors affect the
human condition absent a set of enforceable rules and remind us that,
14. Id.
15. Western societies have less individual commitment to taking care of others in need.
Further, even with governmental programs such as the New Deal and Great Society programs
of this century, millions of Americans are in need of food, clothing, or shelter. At the same time,
many Americans are openly hostile towards these programs. The Utku believe that fortune may
turn on them quite quickly so they look out for one another. It is a form of insurance. In
America, few people believe that they are one step away from famine or homelessness, so the
need to establish a complete safety net does not seem so great.
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no matter what form of public institution governs us, there are always
underlying influences that affect the individual's expectation of privacy.
While the societies with little or no public realm do not have the
same sense of an expectation of privacy as we do because of the lack
of an organized state, there are societies that do have an organized state
yet still lack the freedom to define their private realm. When one of the
factors outlined above dominates the culture completely, that factor
defines the expectation of privacy that individuals have within the
society. One factor, like religion or ideology, can so entwine itself with
the state that it becomes the decisionmaker for all privacy questions
rather than the individual.
Nazi Germany, for example, was so dominated by ideology that the
distinction between the public and private realm lost much of its
meaning. 6 Unlike the ancient Greek and Chinese societies as well as
many modem cultures, the Nazis did not define their realm of privacy
for themselves. Instead, it was decided for them. The dearth of
protection afforded an individual's privacy interests in Nazi Germany
was a function of the Nazi definition of the individual. The Nazis
viewed the individual as prone to anxiety and alienated from the
community until all aspects of the individual's life were integrated and
channeled towards the advancement of the goals of the community. 7
In accordance with this view, the Nazis sought to imbue all facets of the
individual German's life with the objectives of Hitler's regime; thus,
creating a society dominated by one ideology. In other words, of all
the cultural factors that influence a society, here there was one that
could and did override all the others. Hitler's ideology became the
cultural trump card when it came time to define an individual's
expectation of privacy. There was only one source for all the answers.
As George Mosse writes:
Hitler's aim was to construct an organic society in which
every aspect of life would be integrated with its basic
purpose. And in the terms in which this purpose was
promulgated by the National Socialist Party, no one could
be allowed to stand aside. Politics was not just one side of
life, or one among many other sciences; it was instead the
16. See GEORGE L. MOSSE, NAZI CULTURE: INTELLECTUAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL LIFE
IN THE THIRD REICH XX (1966).
17. See id. at xxiv-xxv.
18. Of course, the Nazis also recreated the society by persecuting, jailing, and eventually
killing those who did not fit the Nazi model of a German. The loss of liberty and life for Jews,
homosexuals, and many others was, among other things, the ultimate stripping of individual
privacy rights, but the focus here is on the State's role in the lives of its "favored" citizens.
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concrete expression of the Nazi world view. This world
view was held to be the very crux of what it meant to be a
German, and therefore politics was the consciousness of
race, blood, and soil, the essence of the Nazi definition of
human nature."
In light of this attempt to nationalize the masses, there was, quite
simply, very little room for individualism in Nazi Germany. Individual
concerns were to be yielded entirely to the perceived needs of the
German people as a whole. For example, every village household had
to take in people forced to evacuate their homes because of Allied
bombings." The State entered every house and determined how many
people each house would have to accommodate." As one might expect,
this very limited view of the individual had an adverse effect on
personal privacy.
A key element for Hitler's indoctrination of the masses was to
capture the youth. Control the minds of the young, and you solidify your
hold on the future. The Nazis used the schools to institutionalize the
Nazi ideology.22 Instead of the home, the school became the central
source of rearing and training children.23 "In the name of restoring
tradition, the Nazi state did more than any other regime to break down
parental autonomy and to make the family simply a vehicle of state
policy."24 Thus, the ideology was not found only in the laws of the
state but also in the teachings of youth. The Nazis were able to strip
away personal choices by taking away the opportunities to exercise or
even recognize the option of differing choices. From the earliest of ages,
the Nazi ideology took over as the source for all the answers.
Nazi interference with procreative and sexual autonomy is especially
noteworthy. Nazi racism spurred a drive to increase the birthrate among
the Aryans, and policies were implemented to effectuate this goal.25
First, for Aryan women, abortion was punished with vigor, but among
the "inferior" races, forced sterilization and limitations upon reproduc-
19. MOSSE, supra note 16, at xx.
20. RICHARD BESSEL, LIFE IN THE THIRD REICH 23 (1987).
21. Id.
22. See MOSSE, supra note 16, at xxxiii-xxxv, 263-318.
23. BESSEL, supra note 20, at 21-22.
24. Ingeborg Weber-Kellermann, The German Family Between Private Life and Politics,
in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE, V: RIDDLES OF IDENTITY IN MODERN TIMES 517 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Antoine Prost & G6rard Vincent eds., 1991) (article edited and translated
by Mary Jo Maynes & Michelle Mouton). The author later writes, "Children born and raised
under such a regime would absorb a concept of authority that permeated the entire political
system." Id. at 520.
25. Id. at 517.
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tion became common.26 Second, the Nazis prohibited public employ-
ment to married women whose husbands were employed so that the
women could focus solely on reproducing. According to the Nazi
ideology, when it came to Aryan women, motherhood defined wom-
en.2" Third, homosexuals were vigorously persecuted in Nazi Germany.
They "were arrested and often interred in concentration camps along
with the Jews" and other "undesirables" because they did not contribute
to the propagation of the Aryan race.29
Thus, the low value the Nazis placed on the individual, coupled with
their racist ideology, led to state intrusion into what we consider the
most private aspects of life. Nazi ideology and the state became one. Of
course, not every German believed in the ideology, but it was so
pervasive that it was extraordinarily difficult to exercise any personal
freedom that was not specifically approved by it. Personal beliefs were
not supposed to be the source of one's personal decisions, ideology was.
Another cultural factor that can override all others and become the
sole source for defining an individual's expectations of privacy is
religion. Ironically, in societies where state and religion act as one, the
state, acting with the good intentions of fostering the spiritual well-being
of its citizens, intrudes quite far into the personal lives of individuals.
Thus, religious states often subjugate prerogative for a "greater good."
Ancient Hebrew society after the Exodus can best be defined as a
theocracy; public and religious authorities were one in the same.
Consequently, the Hebrew religion played the primary role in defining
the individual with respect to society, and as such, it did not give the
26. Id. at 521-22.
27. Id. at 520. Interestingly, women who reproduced were honored with the "Mother's
Cross" in different degrees. Id. Mothers with eight or more children received a gold cross, those
with six or seven received a silver cross, and those with four or five received a bronze cross.
Id.
28. As Hitler put it:
If today a female jurist accomplishes ever so much and next door there lives a
mother with five, six, seven children, who are all healthy and well-brought-up, then
I would like to say: From the standpoint of the eternal value of our people the
woman who has given birth to children and raised them and who thereby has given
back our people life for the future has accomplished more and does morel
MOSSE, supra note 16, at 39 (alteration in original) (quoting Speech to the National Socialist
women's organization (Die Frauenschaft) published in the VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER, Sept. 13,
1936).
29. Weber-Kellermann, supra note 24, at 521. Of course, we too outlaw homosexual
activity in most states, even if the laws are not enforced very rigorously. Many communities
have been tackling the issue of discrimination against homosexuals recently, and the debate has
been fierce.
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individual a very expansive definition. The centerpieces of the Hebrew
religion were the solidarity of the Hebrew community and the ever-
watchful eye of the omniscient and omnipotent God. "The very notion
of an area of social and individual life marked off as private and
immune to divine interference would be an impossible absurdity from
this standpoint."3 Thus, even in larger or developing societies, one
factor can still override all others in shaping the individual's expectation
of privacy. Religion dominated in Hebrew society just as climate
dominated the Eskimos.
Not surprisingly, the focus on the solidarity and well-being of the
Hebrew community emphasized the larger concerns of the community
more than individual needs. Moreover, sinfulness--disobedience with
respect to the laws promulgated by God-undermined the well-being of
the community, for the Hebrews believed that God visited his wrath
upon the Hebrews whenever they strayed too far from his law. Because
of the belief that individual sin adversely affected the community, very
little within the realm of the totally private. As Moore writes, the
Hebrew theocracy "confronted the individual in all the decisions of daily
life. It was also a public from whom no secrets were hid and which left
little or no autonomous area for private existence."3
The view of the Hebrew theocracy with respect to sexual autonomy
exemplifies the lack of a significant private realm. There was a number
of sexual crimes for which death was the punishment. These included
adultery, incest, homosexuality, and bestiality.
It would be a mistake to say that absolutely no protection against
governmental intrusion into an individual's life was recognized among
the Hebrews. The Hebrew religion did prohibit the arbitrary use of
power, for no leader was permitted to use power against a subject purely
for his own personal gains. Despite this protection, however, the nature
of the Hebrew theocracy, with its rules governing nearly all aspects of
daily life, did not permit any substantial distinction between public and
private behavior.
Other societies have been dominated by religious beliefs, but the
religion was separated from the state. Victorian England and the early
United States were heavily influenced by religious beliefs but took a
different approach. Rather than making religious laws the state laws,
these societies created a public realm that separated the individual's
private life so that the individual could pursue his or her religious
beliefs without interference from the state. Instead of assimilating the
30. MOORE, supra note 7, at 169.
31. Id. at 176.
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religion into the state, a distinct separation was created so that, ideally,
everyone could worship their god as they believed fit.
One more key factor influencing a society's attitude toward
individual privacy is the way it allocates and protects property rights.
Personal privacy is not something protected only by the state. In many
cultures, privacy can be bought. In the United States, for example, the
level of privacy that a homeless person can expect is much less than that
of the wealthy person who can purchase a large estate surrounded by ten
foot walls. We have the right to be free from governmental intrusion
into our homes absent a compelling state interest, but this right means
little to the people living in shelters or on the streets. The poor often
must divulge highly personal information to the government or a
charitable organization in order to receive aid. If the state were to ask
the same questions of its wealthy citizens, there is little question that we
would consider such questioning an intrusion upon their reasonable
expectations of privacy. Courts have avoided an outright declaration that
the poor have less of a right to privacy than the rich by finding that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy involved when an
individual seeks help from the state.32
Thus, an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy within a
society is dictated by many factors-from those beyond human control,
like climate, to those shaped by cultural mores, like religion and
property rights. In some cases, one factor may so dominate that it
controls the society's concept of individual privacy, while in others,
multiple factors combine to shape it.
II. THE LEGAL TEST
The legal test today symbolizes the struggle between the individual
and the collection of individuals we call government. We teach that the
test is as follows:
1. Does the individual have a reasonable expectation of
privacy?
32. Cf., e.g., City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995) (holding
that an applicant for a state job did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy concerning her
status as a smoker because "individuals must reveal whether they smoke in almost every aspect
of life in today's society"). The theory behind this is that the government does not require the
individual to divulge anything because the individual has "voluntarily" sought governmental aid
or employment. Cf. i. Thus, the individual can avoid the probing questions of the government
by deciding not to seek its aid. Of course, while it is quite easy for a wealthy person to survive
without government aid, the same is not true for an indigent or jobless person.
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2. If so, then the individual qualifies for a fundamental
right which we only can be breached by a compelling
state interest.
3. Is there a compelling state interest to impair the individ-
uals privacy? This is the component where society
weighs in with its needs, such as public safety or health.
4. Is the intrusion done in the least intrusive way? If
society is going to intrude, the goal is to only do so
much as is necessary to meet the public purpose.33
The application of the test makes several points obvious. First, the
right to privacy is not absolute. Intrusions are acceptable where there is
a sufficiently strong state interest. Second, the test of "reasonable
expectation of privacy" is as ethereal as the ordinary or reasonably
prudent person. What is a reasonable expectation of privacy in America
in 1997? Is it different from a reasonable expectation in America in
1845? Is it different in Alaska than it is in New York City? What would
be a reasonable expectation of privacy in Nazi Germany in 1941?
A. Who Is Reasonable?
The conundrum of the test is that the threshold definition of an
important right is based on the expectations of a society with widely
varying expectations. What then is reasonable? It should not necessarily
be what most people feel. As a fundamental human right, privacy should
not be defined by social norms or majority acceptance, and by the same
token, privacy cannot be defined as what one person thinks. These
questions are easier in the abstract than when applied to a practice of
prohibiting a public hospital from treating the sick child of a Christian
Scientist.
B. What Is Compelling?
At this point the plot becomes even more complex. We, the law,
have identified a privacy right that is reasonable for an individual to
expect. How do we determine whether a governmental interest will
override that reasonable expectation?
First, analysts correctly will suggest that many courts at the state and
federal level do not employ the compelling interest standard. They
employ the lower balancing standard. The result is that it is even easier
to override the privacy interest of an individual.
How courts choose which standard to apply is difficult to intuit.
They may choose based on the type of question presented. For example,
33. See id. at 1027-28 (describing the test as applied under the Florida Constitution).
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courts appear to use the balancing test on privacy issues dealing with
personal information as opposed to personal decisions. For example, in
Florida v. Rolling,34 the circuit court judge applied a balancing test to
determine whether the families of victims of violent crimes had a
privacy interest in preventing the release of crime scene photographs
that outweighed the public's "right to information."35 However, in
Beagle v. Beagle,36 where the question was whether the state could
grant visitation rights to grandparents over a parent's objections, the
Supreme Court of Florida utilized strict scrutiny review.37
IV. THE DIFFERENCE IN THE STATE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY: THE FLORIDA EXAMPLE
Based on fundamental constitutional principles, states can exceed
federal constitutional rights in the protection of individual liberties. In
fact, some consider it a duty of the states.38 Florida and ten other states
have textual constitutional rights of privacy.39
In a 1977 landmark decision, Shevin v. Harless, Schaffer, Reid &
Associates, Inc.,4° the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the
Florida Constitution did not guarantee an individual's right of priva-
cy,' thereby sparking widespread interest in the protection of privacy
in political and public settings. The 1978 Florida Constitutional Revision
Commission debated and adopted a privacy provision to be submitted
to the public. The entire revision was defeated. I introduced a similar
privacy provision4" in 1980, which ultimately passed after an extensive
legislative process and lively public debate.
From the start, the intent was to depoliticize, in a partisan sense,
consideration of the amendment. My cosponsors included Republicans
and Democrats, liberals and conservatives. The issue was framed both
as a civil liberties issue, as a response to big government and, as a
34. 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2264 (Fla. 8th Jud. Cir., July 27, 1994).
35. Id. at 2268.
36. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
37. Id. at 1272.
38. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977).
39. Of the 11 states, only California's right to privacy covers both public and private
actors.
40. 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
41. Id. at 639.
42. I introduced the privacy amendment with the intention of providing a basis for
protecting both decisional and informational privacy rights. I used the background information
prepared by Professor Pat Dore and staff analysis from the House Government Operations
Committee to analyze the resolution.
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response to growing invasions of informational privacy spurred by ever-
expanding technical and computer capabilities.43 The amendment was
accepted by the membership in that context. Ultimately the bill passed
overwhelmingly, largely because it had such widely divergent sponsors
and ideologically broad-based arguments.
The bill, as originally drafted, read: "Every natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into his private life." The major difference between this provision and
the Constitutional Revision Commission's provision rejected by the
voters just two years earlier was the addition of the word "unwarranted."
This word created volatile debate during the Commission meetings
because opponents of including the qualifying word, "unwarranted,"
before "governmental intrusion" argued that the word "unwarranted"
suggested that the fundamental privacy right was not as important as
other fundamental rights. Proponents of including the term had equally
strong convictions regarding the benefits of its inclusion. The proponents
insisted that the word "unwarranted" would provide the flexibility which
is traditionally necessary in a constitution, allowing the courts to balance
the competing governmental and private interests in any given fact
scenario.
The subcommittee ultimately passed an amendment on March 11,
1980 striking the term "unwarranted" from the bill. After this decision,
the resolution took on a more absolute tone in the amendatory process.
The existence of Roe v. Wade muted debate on issues like abortion
and gay rights. 5 Proponents suggested the resolution had no effect on
current law since the federal right was assured under the United States
Supreme Court's decision.
Concern over the potential for a conflict between the right to privacy
and the public records law was the focus of the debate as the full
Governmental Operations Committee began its deliberations on April 9,
1980. These concerns were quieted by the addition of the following
amendment: "This section shall not be construed to limit the public's
right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." The
committee passed the amendment unanimously, and the bill passed
without objection as Committee Substitute for HJR 387.
The bill with the addition of the public records provision was read
for the first time on the House floor May 5, 1980. Introducing the bill
43. Arguments for the amendment evoked images of George Orwell's 1984 and concern
over the ability of big government to snoop into one's private life and control personal
decisionmaking.
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. Some anti-gay sentiments surfaced more visibly during the public consideration after
the resolution had passed the legislature.
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to the full House, I cited a recent Harris Poll which indicated that sixty-
five percent of the people polled believed the right of privacy should be
a fundamental right along with "life, liberty and the pursuit of happi-
ness.' '46 The bill gave legislators the opportunity to act against the big
government of the day and gave the public the opportunity to vote
privacy into the realm of protected "fundamental" rights. The bill passed
by the required three-fifths constitutional voice vote, was read for the
third time the next day, May 6, and passed with 98 Yeas to only 4
Nays.
A. The Consideration and Adoption of HJR 387
as SJR 935 by the Florida Senate
The House bill then moved to the Senate and was referred to the
Rules and Calendar Committee. Again, there was concern over whether
forbidden governmental intrusion should somehow be limited. Senator
Dunn, one of the bill's primary opponents, attempted to qualify the
phrase "governmental intrusion" by limiting the right of privacy to
protect citizens from "any unreasonable" government intrusion. The bill
was reported favorably out of the Rules Committee.
The debate on the Senate floor followed the next week. Senator
Dunn offered the same amendment he offered in the Rules Committee.
Senator Dunn expressed concern that the "absolute" privacy right then
reflected in the bill would not permit wiretapping, would affect the
state's taxing authority and lobbying disclosure requirements, would
allow marijuana possession in the home, would legalize sexual activities
of any sort between consenting adults, would limit search and seizure
activities, and would prohibit the investigation of state employees.47
Senator Dunn also argued that there would be a "glut of cases every
time our government attempts to do anything vis-h-vis the private citizen
and his home life."48 Senator Dunn's amendment failed on a voice
vote.
During debate on the bill, Senator Dunn also raised the issue of the
bill's potential impact on abortion and right to life issues. Senator
Gordon, one of the bill's co-sponsors, argued that privacy rights within
46. Jon Mills, Personal Notes of House and Senate Floor Debates (May 1980) (on file with
author).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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the family were protected under the Federal Constitution.49 The final
vote in the Senate was 34 Yeas and 2 Nays.
Much of the debate by the legislature surrounding the privacy
amendment revolved around whether or not to include the term
"unwarranted" to modify the amount of governmental intrusion which
would be tolerated under the privacy amendment. Without a standard by
which to judge a possible infringement of the new constitutional right
to privacy, the amendment suffered from vague language. 0 The Senate
Staff recommendation included the suggestion that the amendment
include the desired standard of judicial review."1 The recommendation,
based on other states with similar constitutional provisions, was one of
"compelling state interest."52 Under this standard, the intrusion would
be allowed only if first authorized by the Constitution and only if there
was a compelling state need for the intrusion. 3 This standard would
shift the burden to the state to justify the reason and need for the
intrusion."
The Staff recommended revising the amendment to read: "Every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as necessitated by a compelling
state interest."55 Professor Pat Dore testified regarding the necessity of
inserting this limitation. She recommended against including the specific
compelling governmental interest balancing test which would likely be
used by the courts based on the bill's language. The bill was reported
favorably out of the Rules Committee.
The Senate Rules Committee rejected the Staff's recommendation
and the Senate and House joined in passing the Amendment without any
qualifying language. The duty of defining the boundaries of the right to
privacy protected by the new amendment would then fall to the Florida
courts.
B. Significance of the Legislative Debate
The legislative debate would prove significant as the Supreme Court
of Florida began to define the right of privacy. The seminal decision
49. Now, we are finding that this is not necessarily true and that the privacy amendment's
most significant function may ultimately be protection of rights of the family if Roe v. Wade
disappears.
50. Senate Staff Analysis (May 6, 1980) (on file with author).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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interpreting the right to privacy, Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel
Wagering,56 came five years after the amendment became effective.
The Winfield court recognized that the amendment was intentionally
phrased in strong terms. The court said: "The drafters of the amendment
rejected the use of the words 'unreasonable' or 'unwarranted' before the
phrase "governmental intrusion" in order to make the privacy right as
strong as possible."57
Winfield established the standard for analysis under Florida's privacy
amendment. As the amendment's legislative proponents had hoped, the
court said the government may infringe on the right of privacy only to
achieve a compelling state interest and only if government pursues its
goal in the least intrusive manner.5 8
C. Florida's Examples
Because of the textual right, Florida has had a more complete experi-
ence in analyzing the wide range of circumstances that generate privacy
litigation than many other jurisdictions. Analyzing privacy cases, writers
frequently have divided cases into those regarding personal decision
(decisional privacy) and those regarding personal information (personal
privacy). This division is imperfect and frustrated by circumstances
which seem to involve both issues. Of note is the indication that courts
seem to adhere to the fundamental rights test more closely and place a
higher regard on controversies involving personal decisions like
abortion. The following are a series examples from Florida showing the
vagaries of protecting privacy even in a state that claims it is a protector
of private rights.
1. Employment
What kind of information can be asked when you are seeking a job?
How about a job in government? The threshold reasonable expectation
question appears to be affected by the fact that an individual is seeking
something from government-a job. Consequently, there is a potential
diminution in an individual's reasonable expectation because of the
56. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
57. Id. at 548.
58. Id. The court held that the privacy amendment did not prevent the Division of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering from subpoenaing Winfield's bank records as part of an investigation. Id. The
threshold question, according to the court, was "whether the law recognize[d] an individual's
legitimate expectation of privacy in financial institution records." Id. at 547. The court was
willing to find that the law recognized this legitimate expectation of privacy, but the court held
that there was a compelling state interest in investigating the pari-mutuel industry and that the
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering least intrusive means to achieve that interest. Id. at 548.
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person's status as a job seeker. Whether this diminution is justified is a
different question.
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that The Florida
Bar was entitled to ask its applicants, "Have you ever received
REGULAR treatment for amnesia, or any form of insanity, emotional
disturbance, nervous or mental disorder?"59 The court concluded that
despite the fact that an applicant has a reasonable expectation of privacy
concerning a record of mental health treatment, there is a compelling
interest for the Bar to examine such information because of the need of
the state to regulate the legal profession.' The court further found that
the bar had used the least intrusive means to implement this public
purpose of assuring fitness of members of the Bar.6 The Court also
added that practicing law was a "privilege" and that there is no
"constitutional right to be admitted to the Bar."'62 Although the court
appeared to review the privacy right of the applicant under the same
standard as any other privacy assertion, one must question whether the
fact that the court found that the plaintiff sought a privilege from
government lessened the state's burden to show a compelling interest.
In dissent, Justice Adkins conceded that while "it is difficult to
conceive of information in which an individual has a greater legitimate
expectation of privacy than medical records containing communications
and other information between an applicant and a psychiatrist, psycholo-
gist, or counselor," it is also true that the state had a compelling
interest.63 He parted ways with the majority as to whether the process
was the least intrusive.' This area of the test provides the opportunity
for the courts to suggest compromise between compelling interests and
individual rights. In fact, current Bar standards are more limited
regarding mental health than this 1984 questionnaire. 5
A more recent case concerning employment presents a prime
exarrple of the legal test being far less important than the articulation
of the nature of the privacy right. In that case, the Third District Court
of Appeal described the privacy right at issue to be the right to decide
whether one can engage in the legal activity of smoking tobacco in
59. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 73, 77 (Fla. 1983).
60. Id. at 75.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 74.
63. Id. at 77 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
65. See Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Application for Admission to The Florida Bar
10 (Revised 10/94) (on file with author) (asking applicants to list serious mental disorders they
have suffered from in the previous ten years and any current disorders which could impair or
limit their ability to practice law).
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one's own home. However, the supreme court, in a decision finding no
violation of the constitutional right to privacy, found that the relevant
right was the information that the individual had smoked tobacco.
In City of North Miami v. Kurtz, the supreme court determined that
the City of North Miami could require a job applicant to sign an
affidavit stating that she had not used tobacco in the preceding year as
a condition for considering her for employment.6 The court found that
the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 7 Moreover, the
court accepted statistics produced by the city to show the costs of
smokers to the city as proof of a compelling interest. 8 However, since
the court found no reasonable expectation of privacy, there was no need
for a showing of a compelling interest.69
The Third District Court of Appeal had found privacy rights
implicated when the "City requires her to refrain from smoking for a
year prior to being considered for employment."7 The supreme court
characterized the issue as involving a job applicant and an issue that in
terms of expectations where "[i]n today's society, smokers are constant-
ly required to reveal whether they smoke."'" Thus, the supreme court
reached the conclusion that there was no expectation of privacy in the
information that a person smokes while the Third District Court of
Appeal said there was a reasonable expectation that the government
could not prevent an applicant from smoking. Perhaps each answers the
question it asks.
2. Abortion
Perhaps the most telling case on the extent of Florida's privacy right
is In re TW.72 While earlier cases articulated the test to be used, this
case dealt with the controversial issue of abortion and concluded that
Florida's privacy right was intended to protect abortion rights and was
more extensive than the federal right.7" The issue was parental consent
for abortion.74 The court concluded that the parental consent statute
was unconstitutional.7" Citing Winfield, the court noted that
66. 653 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 1995).
67. Id. at 1028.
68. Id. at 1028-29.
69. See id. at 1028.
70. Id. at 1027.
71. Id. at 1028.
72. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
73. Id. at 1191-92.
74. Id. at 1188-89. In TW, the abortion had already occurred but because of the major
public concern, the Attorney General sought an advisory opinion. Id. at 1189-90.
75. Id. at 1196. The measure was passed as part of an abortion clinic bill. See FLA. STAT.
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[s]ince the people of this state exercised their prerogative
and enacted an amendment to the Florida Constitution
which expressly and succinctly provides for a strong right
of privacy not found in the United States Constitution, it
can only be concluded that the right is much broader in
scope than that of the Federal Constitution.76
The court concluded that this expanded right "embraces more privacy
interests, and extends more protection to the individual in those
interests, than does the Federal Constitution."" With this reasoning it
seems obvious that the Florida abortion rights are more extensive than
those that existed under the United States Constitution at the time of the
passage of the Florida amendment in 1980.78
The court proceeded to analyze both abortion cases and cases dealing
with the control of government over minors.79 It concluded that "[t]he
challenged statute fails because it intrudes upon the privacy of the
pregnant minor from contraception to birth.' 80 While federal courts
evaluating parental consent statutes required the state to show a
"significant" interest rather than a "compelling" interest, the 7W court
concluded that the Florida standard required a showing of a compelling
state interest.8' And, based on that standard, the court concluded that
the state had not shown a compelling interest to overcome the minor's
privacy rights.8 2
The court also concluded that, even if the state could show a
compelling interest, the statute did not employ the least intrusive means
of furthering the state's interest. 3 Thereby, the statute also failed the
second prong of the Florida privacy test." This conclusion is important
§ 390.001(4)(e) (Supp. 1988).
76. TW, 551 So. 2d at 1191-92 (quoting Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548).
77. Id. at 1192.
78. But see id. at 1202 (Grimes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, this did not mean that Florida voters had elected to create more privacy
rights concerning abortion than those already guaranteed by the United States
Supreme Court. By 1980, abortion rights were well established under the federal
[sic] Constitution, and I believe the privacy amendment had the practical effect of
guaranteeing these same rights under the Florida Constitution.
Id. (Grimes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. See id. at 1192-96.
80. Id. at 1194.
81. Id. at 1195.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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because other members of the court were willing to find a compelling
interest in parental consent." Given a compelling interest, the state
could then attempt to craft a different statute to meet the "least
intrusive" test.
The implication of TW for abortion rights in Florida is clear.
Irrespective of federal changes, Florida citizens have at least the same
abortion rights conferred by the United States Constitution as of 1980
and probably more.
3. Right to Die
Right to die and assisted suicide cases are the most recent and now
among the most controversial privacy cases. Allowing a patient to die
without heroic or intrusive measures is a far different issue than
allowing a third party to administer a lethal dose of morphine at the
request of a terminally ill patient. The law is much more concerned
about affirmative acts and third party actions than permitting natural
causes to take effect.
Florida was willing to take a paternal interest in the life of its
citizens even before the right to privacy amendment was passed in 1980.
For example, mandatory use of motorcycle helmets was upheld in 1969
in a case in which Judge Robert Mann quoted John Donne's statement
that "[a]ny man's death diminishes me. 86 Without a separate textual
right of privacy the state did not have to meet a compelling interest
standard. 7 Thus, the court performed a balancing test and found the
statute requiring helmets constitutional.8
While the issue of physician-assisted death has been a topic of public
debate for many years, especially after Dr. Kervorkian entered the scene,
the issue did not reach the Supreme Court until 1997.9 Just weeks
after arguments were heard before the Court, the same issue reached the
Supreme Court of Florida in Mclver v. Krischer.9 Even though the
Supreme Court held that there was no right to physician-assisted death
85. See id. at 1203 (Grimes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the
statute "reflects a legitimate state concern over the welfare of children and impinges upon the
minor's right to privacy in the least intrusive manner"); cf. id. at 1205 (McDonald, J., dissenting)
("For many purposes, minors are treated differently. I does not offend me in the slightest that
their ability to consent to an abortion is different from adults and is an issue appropriately left
with the legislature.").
86. State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1969).
87. Shevin, 379 So. 2d at 639.
88. Fitel, 227 So. 2d at 490-91.
89. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
90. 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997).
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implicit in the Federal Constitution," the Florida case still was impor-
tant. The Supreme Court let Washington's ban on assisted-suicide stand,
but it did not rule that the states were prohibited from passing laws that
allow physician-assisted death.92 The Court also strengthened its
holding in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department qf Health93
affirming a patient's right to have any artificial means of life support
discontinued.94 Thus, there is a federal right to die when the patient is
being kept alive through artificial means. However, there is a distinction,
according to the Court, between discontinuing life support and prescrib-
ing drugs to bring about death.9" The end result of the two actions is
the same, but the Court drew a line between them.
Thus, Mclver became all the more important. The Supreme Court of
Florida has held on many occasions that the explicit guarantee of
privacy in the Florida Constitution affords more protection that the
implicit federal right.96 Here, the federal right was defined, and the
Supreme Court of Florida has to decide just how much stronger the
State's right is. Had the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Constitu-
tion did guarantee a right to physician-assisted death, the Supreme Court
of Florida would not have had to deal with the enormous political
pressures accompanying the case.
Mclver directly brings the question of the state's interest in an
individual's life. The plaintiffs, Dr. Cecil Mclver and three terminally
ill persons, sued the State's Attorney for Palm Beach County seeking a
declaratory judgment that would declare Florida's assisted self-murder
statute unconstitutional.97 The three terminally ill patients sued to have
the option of receiving the aid of Dr. McIver in hastening their
deaths.9"
Central to the plaintiff's case in Mclver is the reasoning behind In
re Guardianship of Browning,99 in which the Supreme Court of Florida
decided whether the guardian of an incompetent, non-terminally ill
person could exercise the person's right of self-determination by
removing a feeding tube."t The Browning court answered the question
91. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2272.
92. See id. at 2261-75.
93. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("[A] competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment ... ").
94. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79).
95. Id. at 2270.
96. See, e.g., TW, 551 So. 2d at 1192.
97. Mclver, 697 So. 2d at 99 (citing FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (1995)).
98. Id.
99. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
100. Id. at 7-8.
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affirmatively and used the privacy amendment as the basis of its
reasoning.' The court held that "everyone has a fundamental right to
the sole control of his or her person" and that this includes making all
medical choices." Thus, the right of a competent person to choose or
refuse medical treatment is constitutionally protected in Florida. 3
Finally, the court said that it could find no reason to qualify that right
by distinguishing between procedures as "major or minor, ordinary or
extraordinary, life-prolonging, life-maintaining, life-sustaining or
otherwise.""
4. Disclosure of Crime Scene Photographs
The definition of the right to privacy becomes even more difficult
when the individual's right competes with a public constitutional right.
Such was the case when the Eighth Circuit Court considered the
disposition of crime scene photographs in the Danny Rolling multiple
murder trial. 5 The relatives of the victims sought to prevent publica-
tion of the gruesome pictures of their families."° The court confronted
several major legal challenges. For one, the privacy right was claimed
by relatives of the victims for publication of images of the victims. 7
In other words, the victims were not and could not assert their own
privacy right. Second, there was the conflicting notion that legal and
constitutional obligations exist for public disclosure of court docu-
ments.0 8
The judge concluded that the relatives had their own privacy right
which they could assert."9 The court cited instances in other jurisdic-
tions where family members could assert a privacy right to protect
disclosure of information regarding their relatives, including most
prominently the case involving the families of the crew of the Challeng-
er.10
101. Id. at 8, 17.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id. at 11 n.6.
105. Florida v. Rolling, 22 Med. L. Rep. 2264 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. 1994). The author
represented the families as a Special Assistant State Attorney on this issue. Id. at 2265.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 2267-68.
108. See id. at 2270.
109. Id. at 2267-68.
110. Id. (citing N.Y. Times v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628 (D.C. 1991); Williams v. City of
Mineola, 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)).
835
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After concluding the right existed, the judge identified the public
right as the right to know.' Since the right to know is a constitutional
right in Florida, the judge was confronted with two competing constitu-
tional rights. His solution was to balance the two rights and prohibit
publication of the photographs but allow limited public access."' This
analysis is, of course, not the analysis generally articulated for the
privacy right. Perhaps the judge actually articulated an analytical process
which could have been used subliminally to reach the same result using
the existing privacy test. For example, the judge could have found that
the family had a right to privacy in the non-disclosure of the photo-
graphs. The state had a compelling interest in some disclosure based on
constitutional and statutory rights to information. And, finally, the least
intrusive means to exercise that right would be through limited access
and no publication.
The result created a new privacy right in Florida (perhaps unique in
state jurisdictions)-the right of family members against certain
disclosures concerning their relatives. Of course, the nature of the
disclosure in the Rolling case was extreme.
5. Blood Test Information
In Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, Inc.,"' the Supreme
Court of Florida decided that blood donors' privacy interests and
society's interest in a strong volunteer blood system outweigh a
plaintiff's interest in discovering the names and addresses of blood
donors in order to find evidence that he contracted AIDS from blood
supplied by the blood service."4 The plaintiff was struck by a car and
received fifty-one units of blood in surgeries following the accident."5
One year after the accident, he found out that he had AIDS."6 In his
suit against the driver of the automobile, he served the blood bank with
a subpoena duces tecum that requested the names and addresses of its
blood donors."7 The blood bank refused to provide the requested
information."'
111. Id. at 2267.
112. Id. at 2269-70.
113. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
114. Id. at 534.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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The Rasmussen court held that a balancing test must be applied when
deciding whether to issue a protective order in discovery disputes. 19
The court recognized that "[t]he potential for invasion of privacy is
inherent in the litigation process" and that Florida discovery rules give
courts the authority to protect the privacy of individuals."2 In discuss-
ing the competing interests, the court emphasized Florida's privacy
amendment, stating that "there can be no doubt that [it] was intended to
protect the right to determine whether or not sensitive information about
oneself will be disclosed to others.' ' . Rasmussen's interest in discov-
ering the names to see whether any of the blood donors were known
AIDS carriers or convicted drug users could not overcome the blood
donors' interests."
Unlimited access to the names and addresses would allow Rasmussen
to conduct a thorough check into the lives of each blood donor without
any donor's knowledge." Friends, family, co-workers, and employers
could be questioned about the lives of the donors, and once AIDS and
the donor were mentioned in the same sentence to these people, the
donors would be subject to all of the discrimination AIDS patients face.
Also, many people would avoid donating blood in the future, if they
believed that their names and addresses would be available to others
without their permission. The court found that there had to be a way to
verify the blood service's report that none of the fifty-one blood donors
was known to have AIDS without compromising the anonymity of the
donors.24
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida applied a mixed test in deciding
this privacy issue. While recognizing the high value we have for
personal privacy and its constitutional protections-both federal and
state-it did not use strict scrutiny language." Instead, it applied a
balancing test.'26 However, implicit in the language used in balancing
the competing interests were elements of strict scrutiny review. In citing
several federal privacy right cases and Florida's privacy amendment, the
court essentially called the blood donor's privacy interests a fundamental
right. 27 And, the language stating that some other method of verifying
119. Id. at 535.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 536.
122. Id. at 538.
123. Id. at 537.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 534-38.
126. Id. at 535.
127. Id. at 535-37.
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the accuracy of the blood service's report had to be available very easily
could have been pulled from a strict scrutiny analysis.
The missing element was whether or not the state's interest in having
broad discovery rules was compelling. Even though this informational
privacy interest was considered to be of the utmost importance,'2 it
still did not receive the strict scrutiny review applied to decisional
privacy interests.'29
V. THE FUTURE OF THE PRIVACY RIGHT IN FLORIDA
Florida courts have been consistent in articulating the constitutional
test for privacy in Florida. Also, Florida courts interpreting article I,
section 23, consistently have said that Florida's right exceeds the federal
right of privacy.'30 However, the outcomes and application of the test
have been far less predictable as the above cases indicate.
As more politically charged privacy issues come to the Supreme
Court of Florida, the Privacy Amendment becomes more and more
controversial. Abortion opponents, for example, may seek to modify
privacy rights, relating to abortions or parental consent for abortions, so
that the current legislature can pass restrictions on abortions. Finally, the
right could be expanded to include private actors. This would give
individuals protection from the release of information by their employ-
ers, banks, utilities, and more.'
31
The Florida Constitution Revision Commission began meeting in
June 1997. The privacy right has been one of the most, if not the most,
controversial provision. There is little doubt that this commission will
address the issue over the next year. Whether any changes come from
it remains to be seen.
VI. CONCLUSION
Individual and human rights in this country have evolved from
national movements and national standards. The Fourteenth
Amendment's application of rights to the states was a landmark in
human rights, guaranteeing all citizens, no matter their state of
128. Compare Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1025 (giving less weight to the privacy interest in not
having to disclose whether or not a job applicant had used tobacco within the previous 12
months).
129. See, e.g., TW, 551 So. 2d at 1195.
130. See, e.g., Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
131. See Ben F Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privacy in Florida in the
Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for Protection from Private and
Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 26-27 (1997).
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residence, a baseline of protection. The Federal Constitution was the
protector--"states' rights" was the code phrase for discrimination.
But in the American crucible of cultural diversity a national standard
for "community" may result in the lowest common denominator or a
definition based on averaging. Would it not be better when the most
individual of rights, privacy, is implicated to define that right within a
more localized community-the state?
This proposition does not suggest abandoning the federal level of
protection. Some issues involving personal information and privacy have
implications in interstate commerce in the new information society.
Indeed, we cannot constitutionally lower the standard, but since privacy
rights are so ill defined and that broader protection so limited, should
not the states raise the level of protection for their citizens? The ten
states that have individual textual standards are doing so with various
degrees of daring. Florida has developed a broad jurisprudence of
privacy in seventeen years, which provides the basis for future enhance-
ment of individual protections. Florida citizens have put the words in the
constitution and the Supreme Court has told us that the right is
fundamental, extensive and far exceeds federal standards. If the
constitution revision commission, the legislature, and others refrain from
tampering, Florida has the chance to be a laboratory and a haven for one
of the most threatened of rights in today's society.

